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Abstract. In order to increase the security for authenticated key ex-
change protocols, various authentication means can be used together. In
this paper, we introduce a security model for multi-factor authenticated
key exchange, which combines a password, a secure device, and biomet-
ric authentications. We thereafter present a scheme, that can be proven
secure, in the random-oracle model.
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Authentication is deﬁnitely one of the most important goal of modern cryptogra-
phy. In order to avoid mistakes and impersonations during access control we can
use various authentication means, possibly all together, that uniquely identify
someone: a secret information, a biometric or user’s belongings are the most well-
known examples of such authentication factors for human beings. They represent
the three classes of human authentication factors generally admitted, namely:
– something you know (as a secret password),
– something you have (as an unclonable secure device with a secret key),
– something you are (as a biometric).
Brainard et al. [15] have recently proposed a fourth authentication means: some-
one you know, also called the social networking. However we focus in this pa-
per on the classical “three-factor authentication” technique, involving the three
above factors. They are all subject to various types of attacks, notably attacks
that cannot be avoided using cryptographic techniques only, but require external
security protections:
– the password can be recovered through social engineering (phishing [29] or
malwares), and thus users have to be careful when they enter it;
– the device can be stolen, open or cloned, and thus the device must be pro-
tected using tamper-resistant techniques;
– the biometric can be copied, and thus the sensor has to be able to correctly
detect whether the controlled biometric is a real one, corresponds to the
human-being under control, and to certify it.
Combining the three factors in the same authentication protocol could increase
the security since the adversary would have to break the three protections inorder to win. However, involving the three factors does not necessarily requires
the adversary to break all the protections in order to break the scheme, if the
latter is not well designed: a security model for authentication based on a secret
key, on a password and on a biometric, all together, has to be provided, in order
to be able to formally prove that the design is correct.
In addition to simple authentication (access control), in case of success, the
two parties may be interested in coming up with a common ephemeral secret
key to establish a secure channel [8,17,19]. We are thus interested, not only in
authentication, but in Authenticated Key Exchange [4,8]. In the following we
focus on such AKE protocols, combining the three above authentication means.
This basically means that if the three authentication veriﬁcations simultaneously
succeed, then the 2 parties should come up with a session key that is semantically
secure (indistinguishable from a truly random key to any other party), otherwise
nobody learns anything.
Issues raised by PKI-based [8,17,18] and password-based [6,14,16] AKE are
now well understood, and several solutions are known. The PKI/public-key set-
ting is deﬁnitely the easiest case, since signatures [28] can be used to authenticate
the ﬂows, or alternatively the ability to decrypt, using an asymmetric encryp-
tion scheme [26,31]. In the password-based setting, one has to take care of the
(oﬀ-line) dictionary attacks [9]. We indeed cannot avoid the on-line dictionary
attack, which consists in trying to impersonate one party with a random pass-
word, and do it again, until the correct password is used. We thus want to prove
that this is the best attack. Note that in many cases, such attacks can be pre-
vented or damages can be reduced with appropriate techniques (delays after a
failure, limited number of failures, etc).
However, biometric-based authentication raises quite diﬀerent issues. First
of all, biometric cannot be assumed a secret information. Indeed, recovering a
ﬁngerprint from the object someone has just touched is an easy task, or getting
an image of the iris simply requires a camera. That is why considering biometric
as a truly secret information and treating it the same way as a private key is
not reasonable in practice, even if this scenario has often been assumed in the
literature [30,24,12,13,23].
On the other hand, if the biometrics are public, how do we prevent an ad-
versary from impersonating an honest user? The only way to use biometrics for
authentication is to guarantee that the biometric template comes from a real
living human being and not from a fake copy. Several technical solutions have
been elaborated to guarantee this (authenticated channels, various biometric
features controlled at the same time, sensor under human supervision, ...). The
assumption that biometrics really come from the living human being under con-
trol is called the liveness assumption. It also implies that all computations made
from the biometric data are done honestly. This assumption is not only useful
for authentication, it is compulsory to ensure authentication security. This is a
strong, but necessary, assumption. Practical solutions exist to achieve, but are
out of the scope of the this paper.Secondly, and more importantly from a technical point of view, two measure-
ments of the same biometric lead to diﬀerent templates. Since a speciﬁc template
cannot be reproduced, a matching mechanism has to be used to compare two
templates and determine if they come from the same biometric or from two dif-
ferent persons. The matching can for example be based on a simple threshold on
the distance between the candidate template and the reference template (as it
is the case for iris [20]). However all known matching systems are not foolproof:
they introduce two possible errors, “false acceptance” (when the system accepts
someone it should not) and “false rejection” (when the system does not recognize
someone it should). Therefore, an AKE protocol based on biometrics has to deal
with these measurement errors and make this matching possible, but should not
increase signiﬁcantly the “false acceptance” and “false rejection” rates.
Finally, biometrics can be used to unequivocally identify an individual and
are often linked with other personal information in the database. Since these
databases can be vulnerable to internal or external adversaries, the privacy of
the database is a classical requirement. Even if we already noticed that they
cannot be considered as private information, biometric templates are critical
data, especially when they are gathered in a database. Privacy is thus a major
concern here.
1.2 Related Works
As already mentioned, literature about PKI-based and password-based AKE is
rich of many results [8,17,18,6,14,16].
Dealing with biometric measurement errors is a much more challenging task
and two dedicated tools were formalized by Dodis et al. [24]: secure sketches
and fuzzy extractors. They allow, from an erroneous biometric measurement
and public information, to always generate the same biometric template and
random bitstring respectively. These tools were improved and allowed to design
biometric-based AKE [24,12,13]. However, these tools rely on the assumption
that biometrics are private information, which we do not allow in this paper.
Several eﬀorts were taken to design authentication protocols were the match-
ing is made on the client side [3]. But in client-side protocols the client sensor
must record a reference biometric template for the user(s), which can be heavy
if numerous people use the same sensor.
Despite all the eﬀorts taken for 1-factor authentication or AKE protocols,
literature does not tell much on multi-factor authentication protocols. In [11],
an encoding for ﬁngerprints is proposed, which is thereafter included in the
design of a two-factor authentication protocol. Their ﬁngerprint encoding has
the property that two measurements of the same ﬁngerprint leads to the same
encoding, despite the errors. They make good use of it, since no matching is
needed anymore and they can use classical cryptographic tools. They propose to
use zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge [27], so that the database cannot have
any information about the biometric template that it records. They assume that
the biometric is private, however their protocol can be proven secure even if
biometric template is public. This protocol has nice features, but it heavily relieson the fact that thanks to their encoding, they get rid of errors. There is not
such encoding for all biometrics and this protocol is therefore very restrictive.
Furthermore, it achieves authentication only, but does not help to establish a
secure channel.
1.3 Our Solution
We propose a Multi-Factor based AKE (MFAKE) which preserves database pri-
vacy. From three factors (a password, a high entropy secret key and a biometric
template) the protocol generates a common semantically secure secret key, in
order to establish a secure channel. The protocol is designed so that the match-
ing is made on the server side and is adapted for a matching based on a simple
threshold on the distance between the candidate template, and a reference tem-
plate. Therefore, it is particularly well-suited to iris which is eﬃciently encoded
on 1024-bit string, but can also apply on some other biometric techniques, with
appropriate encoding.
Derived from PKI-AKE, PAKE and biometric-based AKE security models,
we ﬁrst deﬁne a new and clear security model for MFAKE protocols, which
combines all the corresponding security properties. We chose to extend the Real-
or-Random model, since the latter is strictly stronger than the Find-then-Guess
model in the password-based setting [1]. The model allows the adversary to make
several corruptions, on the secret key, the password, or the sensor. And despite
two corrupt queries, the new keys should still remain semantically secure: in
this model a protocol is provably as secure as the strongest remaining factor.
Furthermore, our model also deals with the forward-secrecy, which means that,
even when all the authentication means are corrupted, a session key established
before the last corruption remains semantically secure. However, note that we
only consider client-authentication (Test-queries will be allowed to the server
only, in the formal security model below). This can be seen as a strong limitation,
but it is not in practice: if the password and the secret keys are compromised,
an adversary can easily play the role of the server, since there is no more secret
(the biometric is public and the liveness assumption is valid on the client side
only), whatever the protocol is. Authentication of the server to the client could
be satisﬁed, until the two secret information related to the client (secret key and
password) are compromised, but we do not address it in this model.
Then we also provide a protocol that is secure, according to this model, in the
random-oracle [7]. This protocol records an encrypted version of the biometric
template on the server side. Therefore privacy of the database (and thus of all the
biometric templates) is preserved, even to the server, and thus even if the server
is compromised. The protocol is proven to have a tight security proof: when the
password is the last factor not to be corrupted, on-line dictionary attacks are the
most eﬃcient attacks that can be mounted; when the biometric is the last one,
the adversary probability to be accepted is nearly equal to the false-acceptance
probability; when the secret key is still private, the security level is quite strong
since it requires the adversary to break the Diﬃe-Hellman problem [22].2 Security Model
In this section, we describe the security model for multi-factor authenticated key
exchange (later denoted MFAKE). This model is built upon the usual password-
authenticated key exchange security model [8,6], in the Real-or-Random indis-
tinguishability framework [5,1].
2.1 Notation
We ﬁrst explain the notation and the assumptions about the authentication
means.
Participants, Sessions and Partnering. In a MFAKE, participants are
either clients C or a unique, trusted server S. The server and every client can
activate several instances at a time, in order to run several sessions concurrently.
The instance i of the entity U, where U is a client or the server, is denoted as
Πi
U. This instance includes three variables, initialized as null:
– pid
i
U: the partner identiﬁer which is the instance with whom Πi
U believes it
is interacting,
– sid
i
U: the session identiﬁer, in practice it can be the transcript seen by Πi
U
(concatenation of the received/sent ﬂows, excepted the last one).
– acci
U: a boolean variable which is ﬁxed at the end of the session and denotes
whether the instance Πi
U goes in an accepted state or not.
The two instances Πi
U and Π
j
U′ are said to be partners if the following conditions
are fulﬁlled:
1. pid
i
U = Π
j
U′ and pid
j
U′ = Πi
U;
2. sid
i
U = sid
j
U′  = null;
3. acci
U = acc
j
U′ = 1.
Long-Lived Keys. Each client C owns a tuple tC = (DC,skC,pwdC), where DC
is a probability distribution for his biometric, while skC and pwdC are a high-
entropy private key and a low-entropy password respectively. The server holds a
list of tuples tS =  tS[C] , where tS[C] is a transformed-tuple of tC. More precisely,
when the client C enrolls in the system, he generates a biometric template WC,
according to the distribution DC, as well as two private data skC and pwdC. The
tuple tS[C] is then an (injective) transformation of (WC,skC,pwdC).
Biometric Templates. As explained above, for each client C, DC deﬁnes the
probability distribution of his biometric (ﬁngerprint, face, iris, etc). In order to
be relevant for authentication, we have to make some assumptions about the
matching process, and more precisely about the encoding and the Hamming
distance, since we will use this distance in the matching decision:– on the one hand, the distance between two templates WC and W ′
C of the same
biometric is low with great probability. More concretely, there is a threshold
t, such that for any C,
Pr[WC ← DC,W
′
C ← DC : dH(WC,W
′
C) ≤ t] ≥ 1 − εfr.
The subscript fr stands for “false rejection”.
– on the other hand, for any pair of distinct clients C  = C′, the distance
between WC and WC′ is high with great probability. More precisely, there
exist a threshold τ ≥ t, such that for any C  = C′,
Pr[WC ← DC,WC′ ← DC′ : dH(WC,WC′) > τ] ≥ 1 − εfa.
The subscript fa stands for “false acceptance”.
We assume that for all the clients C, the biometric distribution DC is public.
Under the liveness assumption explained below the biometric acceptance will
guarantee that the client is like the intended client.
Private Data. The private key component skC is chosen uniformly in a set of
private keys Keys, where Keys is assumed to be very large (with high entropy),
such that 1/#Keys is negligible. It will be stored in a secure device. The accep-
tance of this private key, with respect to a public key, will guarantee that the
client has the device.
On the opposite, the password component pwdC is chosen in a ﬁxed low-
entropy dictionary Dict ⊂ Z⋆
p, according to the probability distribution Dpwd. We
denote by Dpwd(q) the sum of the probability of the q most probable passwords
according to Dpwd. The knowledge of the password will guarantee that the client
knows it.
Liveness Assumption. Since we assume the biometric to possibly be public
(the opposite assumption is not reasonable in practice), then the liveness as-
sumption [32,21], though quite strong, is necessary. It prevents the attacker from
making replay attacks and from altering the computations made by the sensor.
The liveness assumption implies that the biometric is fresh, comes from a real
living person (and not using a fake biometric feature), and that the computations
are made from this biometric honestly.
To model this assumption, a computation oracle Compute(Πi
C,W′,sk,pwd)
is used: according to the state of the client instance Πi
C, from the secrets sk,pwd
and a random value of W′, it computes honestly the message which would have
been generated by C with these inputs, following the protocol.
As it models an attempt of the attacker to authenticate using its own bio-
metric, W ′ has to be chosen according to a (wrong) distribution D, such that
Pr[W ′ ← D,WC ← DC : dH(W ′,WC) > τ] ≥ 1 − εfa.
With the liveness assumption for the client C, we consider that all the mes-
sages involving the biometric, claimed to be sent by C, have been previously
generated by the computation oracle.Corruption. As explained below, the adversary will be allowed to corrupt a
client C, by learning the password pwdC (phishing), by getting the private key skC
(side-channel attack on the device), or by breaking the above liveness assumption
(attack on the sensor).
2.2 Semantic Security
Adversarial Capabilities and Goals. The semantic security of the key is
modeled using the Real-or-Randomparadigm [5,1]. At the beginning of the game,
the challenger chooses a random bit b which determines its behavior when an-
swering Test-queries during the game (it provides either real keys or random keys
to the adversary). The adversary may interact with protocol instances through
several oracles, and at the end of the game, she sends a bit b′. If b = b′, she wins,
otherwise, she looses. The available queries are as follows:
– Send(m,Πi
U): this query allows the adversary to play with the instances, by
intercepting, forwarding, modifying or creating messages. The output of this
query is the answer generated by instance Πi
U to the message m. As stated
above, if pid
i
S = Π
j
C is the client instance with whom the server believes to
talk, if the liveness assumption still holds for the client C (no corruption)
and if the computation of m involves the biometric, then m has to have been
previously generated through a Compute(Π
j
C,W′,sk,pwd) query.
– Reveal(Πi
U): this query models the leakage of information about the session
key agreed on by the parties. For example, if it is misused afterward. There-
fore, if no session key is deﬁned for this instance, or if the instance (or its
partner) has been tested (see below), then the output is ⊥. Otherwise, the
oracle outputs the session key computed by the instance Πi
U.
– CorruptKey(C,a): this query models corruption capabilities of the adversary.
She can indeed steal/break one or several authentication factors of clients.
• If a = 1, the oracle outputs the password pwdC of C;
• if a = 2, the oracle outputs the secret key skC of C;
• if a = 3, the attacker is now allowed to submit any message involving
the biometry, without asking the computation oracle Compute before. It
models the attack against the liveness assumption.
Note that in the following, we will restrict to non-adaptive corruptions: no
corruption can be performed during a session, but before a new session starts.
To formally model the semantic security with respect to client authentication,
the adversary can ask Test-queries, but to the server only: we are interested in
the privacy of the key established with the real server only. We only consider
adversaries whose goal is to impersonate a client to the server. Of course, to
achieve this goal, the adversary may try to impersonate the server to the client
in order to learn some information about the long-lived keys of the client. But
only a client impersonation will be considered as a successful attack:
– Test(Πi
S): if Πi
S is not fresh (see below), then output ⊥, otherwise the oracle
sends• the session key of instance Πi
S (that is Reveal(Πi
S)), if b = 1 – the real
case;
• a random key from the same domain, if b = 0 – the random case.
Freshness. The freshness notion basically deﬁnes session keys that are not
trivially known to the adversary. Since we will focus on the freshness of the
server only, we say that the session key of instance Πi
S is fresh if:
– upon acceptance, C (corresponding to the partner of Πi
S) was not fully cor-
rupted. This means that strictly less then 3 CorruptKey-queries had been
asked to the client C;
– no Reveal-query has been sent to either Πi
S or its partner.
Semantic Security. Let denote by Succ the event that the adversary A cor-
rectly guesses the bit b used by the challenger during the above attack game.
The mfake-advantage adv
mfake
P (A) and the advantage function of the protocol
P are respectively:
adv
mfake
P (A) = 2   Pr[Succ] − 1, adv
mfake
P (t,Q) = max
A
￿
adv
mfake
P (A)
￿
,
where the maximum is over all the attackers with time-complexity at most t and
number of queries at most Q.
Forward-Secrecy. Forward-secrecy means that as soon as a session key is
securely generated (semantically secure), it will remain secure even after corrup-
tion. In order to capture this security level, the model must allow the adversary
to perform Test-queries, even when the 3 CorruptKey-queries have been asked,
but on sessions completed before the full corruption of the client. One can also
consider that upon acceptance, a session is fresh if less than 3 CorruptKey-queries
have been asked.
Client Authentication. We also usually model an attack against the uni-
lateral authentication of the client to the server by considering sessions where
the server accepts, but without any client-partner. Let denote by Succ the event
that a server instance accepts with no partner instance of the client (with the
same partial transcript).
The auth-success Succ
auth
P (A) and the success function of the protocol P
are respectively:
Succ
auth
P (A) = Pr[Succ], Succ
auth
P (t,Q) = max
A
￿
Succ
auth
P (A)
￿
,
where the maximum is over all the attackers with time-complexity at most t and
number of queries at most Q.
3 Description of the Protocol
The complete description of our protocol is provided Figure 1. It assumes a
common setup, with parameters (u,v,p,g,q), where g is an element of order qin Z⋆
p, and generates the subgroup G. Then, u and v are random elements in G.
We also model H as a random oracle [7].
The server stores all the data corresponding to user C, provided during the
enrollment phase:
– the public key h = gxC, related to the high-entropy secret xC;
– an El Gamal encryption [25] of the reference biometric template WC =
(Wi)i≤N —where Wi is the i-th bit of WC and N the number of bits—
under the public key h = gxC, that is tuple of pairs (gri,hrigWi)i;
– the password pwdC ∈ D ⊂ Z⋆
q.
One can note that the server actually does not know the biometrics of the clients
since they are encrypted under keys chosen by the clients.
C : (W
′
C = (W
′
i)i,skC = xC,pwdC) S :
`
(g
ri,h
rig
Wi)i,h = g
xC,pwdC,C
´
C
b
$ ← Zq and B = g
b, B
∗ = B   v
pwdC C, B
∗
− − − − − − →
S,(g
si)i,A
∗
← − − − − − − − −
For 1 ≤ i ≤ N,
r
′
i
$ ← Zq and compute
g
si = g
r′
i   g
ri,h
sig
Wi = h
r′i   h
rig
Wi
a
$ ← Zq, A = g
a, A
∗ = A   u
pwdC
For 1 ≤ i ≤ N,
compute H(K
′
i) = α
′
i β
′
i k
′
i with:
KC =
“
A∗
upwdC
”b
,K
i
C = (g
si)
xC   g
W′
i
K
′
i=S
‚
‚ ‚C
‚
‚ ‚(g
si)i
‚
‚ ‚A
∗
‚
‚ ‚B
∗
‚
‚ ‚K
i
C
‚
‚ ‚KC
‚
‚ ‚pwdC
‚
‚ ‚i
(α
′
i)i
− − − − − − →
(βi)i
← − − − − − −
For 1 ≤ i ≤ N,H(Ki) = αi βi ki with:
KS = (
B∗
vpwdC )
a,K
i
S = h
si   g
Wi
Ki=S
‚
‚
‚C
‚
‚
‚(g
si)i
‚
‚
‚A
∗
‚
‚
‚B
∗
‚
‚
‚K
i
S
‚
‚
‚KS
‚
‚
‚pwdC
‚
‚
‚i
If #{i: αi  = α
′
i} ≤ t
Then acc = 1, K = lsbk
“
 i: αi=α′
iki
”
Else acc = 0, K
$ ← {0,1}
k,βi
$ ← {0,1}
ℓ
If #{i: βi  = β
′
i} ≤ t
Then acc = 1, K
′ = lsbk
“
 i: αi=α′
ik
′
i
”
Else acc = 0, K
′ $ ← {0,1}
k
Fig.1. Our MFAKE ProtocolFor authenticating himself, the client C owns an ephemeral biometric tem-
plate W ′
C = (W ′
i)i; the long-term private key xC; and the password pwdC ∈ D ⊂
Z⋆
q.
The protocol guarantees that, if the ephemeral template W ′
C is close enough
to the reference template WC (who you are), if the private key xC corresponds
to the public key h (what you have), and if the passwords are the same (what
you know), then the server accepts the client, and they agree on an ephemeral
common secret K′ = K.
We namely want to prove that unless the three authentication factors have
been corrupted, no adversary can impersonate a client to the server. And all the
keys actually agreed on between a client and the server are semantically secure,
even after corruptions (forward-secrecy).
Basically, (B∗,A∗) corresponds to the Password-Authenticated part (similar
to EKE [9,2]); for each i, (h,gsi) is a Diﬃe-Hellman key agreement which leads to
the key gxC si, with xC used for authentication. Note that the si are rerandomized
every time, so that the Diﬃe-Hellman key exchange is not static. The bit Wi
(or W ′
i for the client) of the biometric template is used as a mask and we obtain
gxC si   gWi (gxC si   gW
′
i for the client). If for most of i the masks Wi and W ′
i
are equal, then for most of i the authenticators α′
i and veriﬁers αi will be equal
also, as well as βi and β′
i, and ki and k′
i.
To deﬁne the partnership in our protocol, we have to precise that the sid is
equal to the ﬁrst two ﬂows ((C,B∗),(S,(gsi)i,A∗)).
4 Security of the Protocol
Before stating the security result, let us remind the computational assumption
on which the security will rely.
Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem. Let G be a cyclic group of order
q. Let g be a generator of G, let (x,y) be two integers uniformly chosen in Zq. The
computational Diﬃe-Hellman problem states that, given (gx,gy), it is diﬃcult
to compute gxy = CDHg(gx,gy).
Let A be a CDH-adversary with running time at most T. We denote by
Succ
cdh
g (A) the probability that A succeeds in computing gxy from (gx,gy) and
by Succ
cdh
g (T) = maxA{Succ
cdh
g (A)} where the maximum is taken over all the
adversaries with running-time at most T.
Biometric. We remind that for any client C and any adversary which uses a
true biometric W ′, we have Pr[dH(W ′,WC) > τ] ≤ 1 − εfa where τ is an integer
greater than t. The protocol does not increase the false-rejection probability but
it does increase the false-acceptance probability, due to the additional check on
the αi = α′
i equalities. The increasing is upper-bounded by
Pr[#{i : α′
i  = αi} ≤ t|dH(W ′,WC) > τ] ≤
￿ τ
τ−t
￿
2ℓ(τ−t).A protocol session between two honest entities is correct if for all i, Ki = K′
i is
equivalent to αi = α′
i or βi = β′
i. It fails if there is an index i such that Ki  = K′
i
and αi = α′
i or βi = β′
i. As there are at most t indexes i such that Ki  = K′
i the
probability that an honest protocol session is not correct is upper bounded by
2tPr[αi = α′
i: Ki  = K′
i] which is equal to 2t/2ℓ.
Theorem 1. Let us consider the above protocol P over a group of prime order
q, where the dictionary of passwords is equipped with the distribution D ⊂ Z⋆
q.
Let A be an adversary against the semantic security within a time bound T,
with less than qsession Send-queries and asking less than qh queries to the random
oracle. Then we have
adv
mfake
P (A) ≤ 2
X
C
D(qC) + 4q2
h   Succ
cdh
g (T + 4τe) +
q2
session
q
+
2qh
q
Succ
auth
P (A) ≤
X
C
D(qC) + 2q2
h   Succ
cdh
g (T + 4τe) +
q2
session
2q
+
qh
q
+qsession
 
εfa +
￿ τ
τ−t
￿
2ℓ(τ−t) +
Nt   (2ℓ − 1)t
2ℓN(t − 1)!
!
where τe denotes the computational time for one exponentiation and qC the num-
ber of active sessions the adversary ran against client C.
Proof. The proof consists of a sequence of games:
Game 0. This is the real attack game, against the protocol. We are interested
in the two following events:
– S0 (for semantic security) which occurs if the adversary correctly guesses the
bit b chosen at the beginning of the game.
– A0 (for client authentication), which occurs if a server instance accepts with
no partner instance of the client (with the same transcript).
Actually in any game Gn, we study the event An, and the event Sn. Note that
adv
mfake (A) = 2Pr[S0] − 1, Succ
auth (A) = Pr[A0].
Therefore
adv
mfake
P (A) = 2Pr[Sn] − 1 + 2(Pr[S0] − Pr[Sn]) ≤ 2Pr[Sn] − 1 + 2
n−1 X
i=0
 i
Succ
auth
P (A) = Pr[An] + (Pr[A0] − Pr[An]) ≤ Pr[An] +
n−1 X
i=0
 i,
if we denote by  i the distance between games Gi and Gi+1.
Game 1. In this game, we simulate the random oracles (H, but also an additional
function H′ that will appear in the game G3) as usual by maintaining lists ΛH
and ΛH′. We also simulate all the instances, as the real players would do, for theSend-queries and the Reveal and Test-queries. From this simulation, we see that
the game is indistinguishable from the real attack:  0 = 0.
Note that since the probability distributions of the biometrics are public,
we draw a random reference template for each client, to be used/known by the
server. And when needed (simulation of a client), we can draw a random biomet-
ric according to the (public) probability distribution of the client’s biometric.
Game 2. In order to guarantee independence of the sessions, we cancel games
in which some collision on the session transcripts ((C,B),(S,A∗,(gsi)i)) appear.
Since transcripts involve at least one honest party, (A∗,(gsi)i) or B∗ is truly
uniformly distributed. Therefore the collision probability is upper bounded by
q2
session/2q, where qsession is the number of sessions:  1 ≤ q2
session/2q.
Game 3. We now replace the generation of the authenticators and session keys
with a private oracle H′ instead of H, for all the sessions that are fresh (which can
be tested: involving a server so that the intended client is not fully corrupted),
and also for all the sessions involving a client (but no server) for which the
password and the secret key are unknown (none of the 1-CorruptKey and 2-
CorruptKey-queries has been asked): instead of using the public oracle H, we use
the private oracles H′, on Ki and K′
i computed as
Ki = S
￿ ￿
￿C
￿ ￿
￿(gsi)i
￿ ￿
￿A∗
￿ ￿
￿B∗
￿ ￿
￿gWi
￿ ￿
￿i K′
i = S
￿ ￿
￿C
￿ ￿
￿(gsi)i
￿ ￿
￿A∗
￿ ￿
￿B∗
￿ ￿
￿gW
′
i
￿ ￿
￿i.
As already explained, we have chosen a random reference biometric template
for each user. And when needed, we can draw a random biometric according
to the (public) probability distribution of the client’s biometric. Thus we can
include gWi or gW
′
i in the above public computations, in order to make Ki and
K′
i possibly diﬀerent, even for compatible biometric templates.
We do not use none of KC, Ki
C, KS and Ki
S anymore, therefore we can omit
their computations. Besides, we do not use A and B anymore, therefore we can
change the computations of A∗ and B∗ by a∗ $ ← Zq, A∗ = ga
∗
and b∗ $ ← Zq,
B∗ = gb
∗
. Lastly, since we do not use neither the password nor the secret key,
we can choose them at the last moment: for the password-corrupt query (1-
CorruptKey) or for the secret key-corrupt query (2-CorruptKey), or at the very
end of the game only (when the adversary gives her answer).
However, when a client is fully corrupted (adversary against the server) or
the adversary plays against a client from which she knows the password and the
secret key, the keys Ki and K′
i are computed normally and we use the public
oracle H again.
Note that we restrict to non-adaptive corruptions, and thus, when a session
starts, we know the corruption status of a client. Then, requests to the Compute-
oracle will also focus on such a session for which we know the corruption status,
since the biometric is only involved in the third round. The latter oracle indeed
has to know how to perform the simulation of K′
i, using either H or H′.
The games G2 and G3 are indistinguishable unless some speciﬁc hash query
is asked (for a session made before the last CorruptKey-query): if the adversaryasks either
S
￿
￿ ￿C
￿
￿ ￿(gsi)i
￿
￿ ￿A∗
￿
￿ ￿B∗
￿
￿ ￿Ki
C
￿
￿ ￿KC
￿
￿ ￿pwdC
￿
￿ ￿i or S
￿
￿ ￿C
￿
￿ ￿(gsi)i
￿
￿ ￿A∗
￿
￿ ￿B∗
￿
￿ ￿Ki
S
￿
￿ ￿KS
￿
￿ ￿pwdC
￿
￿ ￿i,
for some transcript ((C,B∗),(S,A∗,(gsi)i)), and some index i, to the H function,
whereas the H′ function has been used by the simulator. We denote by AskH3
such an event. Note that, it can be decided whether this event happened only
when the password and the secret key have both been chosen.
In this game, for all clients, the (αi)i, the (βi)i and the key are computed
from a private random oracle. Therefore, whatever the bit b involved in the
Test-query, the answer is random, and independent for all the sessions, unless
some transcript ((C,B∗),(S,A∗,(gsi)i)) appeared twice, but this has already
been excluded in game G2. Therefore we have:
 2 ≤ Pr[AskH3] and Pr[S3] =
1
2
.
Similarly, the only possibility for the adversary to authenticate against a true
server instance is to guess the αi at random or to use the Compute-oracle, unless
some transcript ((C,B∗),(S,A∗,(gsi)i)) appeared twice.
If she tries to guess the αi at random, since |αi| = ℓ, then her probability to
succeed is upper-bounded by:
1
2Nℓ  
t X
k=0
￿
N
k
￿
(2ℓ − 1)k ≤
Nt   (2ℓ − 1)t
2ℓN(t − 1)!
,
If she uses the Compute-oracle, all the α′
i and βi are generated through a
trusted computation oracle and since the adversary uses her own biometric W ′,
which is, with high probability, quite diﬀerent from the client biometric WC,
her probability to succeed is exactly the false-acceptance probability computed
earlier.
As a consequence,
Pr[A3] ≤ qsession
 
εfa +
￿ τ
τ−t
￿
2ℓ(τ−t) +
Nt   (2ℓ − 1)t
2ℓN(t − 1)!
!
.
Game 4. Our goal is now to upper-bound the probability of event AskH3. We
denote by AskH4 the same event in this game and have AskH3 ≤ AskH4 + 3. In
this game, we receive a Diﬃe-Hellman pair (X = gx,Y = gy), and we will try to
show that the probability of event AskH is related to the probability of computing
the Diﬃe-Hellman value of (X,Y ). We set u = X and v = Y . We furthermore
cancel games in which, for a transcript ((C,B∗),(S,A∗,(gsi)i)), which both
– was generated before a password-corrupt query to the client C was made
– comes from an execution involving the adversary, against either an instance
of the client C or the server Sthere are two tuples (A∗,B∗,CDHg(A∗/upwdk,B∗/vpwdk),ik), with two diﬀerent
passwords pwd0 and pwd1 and two, possibly diﬀerent, indexes i0 and i1, such
that
S
￿ ￿
￿C
￿ ￿
￿(gsi)i
￿ ￿
￿A∗
￿ ￿
￿B∗
￿ ￿
￿K
ik
S
￿ ￿
￿CDHg(A∗/upwdk,B/vpwdk)
￿ ￿
￿pwdk
￿ ￿
￿ik
is in ΛH.
Distance. We ﬁrst easily show that  3 ≤ q2
h Succ
cdh
g (T +3τe). To this aim, we
remind that the distance we study comes from the fact we have canceled games
in which, for some speciﬁc transcript ((C,B∗),(S,A∗,(gsi)i)) —which was gener-
ated before a password-corrupt query to the client C was made and which comes
from an execution involving the adversary, against either an instance of the client
C or the server S—, there are two tuples (A∗,B∗,CDHg(A∗/upwdk,B∗/vpwdk),ik),
with two diﬀerent passwords pwd0 and pwd1 and two, possibly diﬀerent, indexes
i0 and i1, such that
S
￿
￿
￿C
￿
￿
￿(g
si)i
￿
￿
￿A
∗
￿
￿
￿B
∗
￿
￿
￿K
ik
S
￿
￿
￿CDHg(A
∗/u
pwdk,B/v
pwdk)
￿
￿
￿pwdk
￿
￿
￿ik
is in ΛH.
If such a pair exists, then for k = 0,1: CDHg(A∗/upwdk,B∗/vpwdk) is equal to
CDHg(A∗,B∗)   CDHg(u−1,B∗)pwdk   CDHg(A∗,v−1)pwdk
CDHg(u,v)pwd2
k
.
Since we simulated either A∗ or B∗, knowing the discrete logarithms, we can
extract CDHg(X,Y ). Let us show it when B∗ = gb
∗
, it works similarly when we
know A∗ = ga
∗
: since the two passwords are diﬀerent and non-zero,
CDHg(X,Y ) =
CDHg(A∗/upwd0,B∗/vpwd0)1/pwd0(pwd1−pwd0)
CDHg(A∗/upwd1,B∗/vpwd1)1/pwd1(pwd1−pwd0)   (A
∗)
−b
∗/pwd0pwd1 .
Conclusion. In order to conclude with the computation of Pr[AskH4], we dis-
tinguish the events when the transcript ((C,B∗),(S,A∗,(gsi)i)) comes from an
execution between:
– two instances of C and S, or an instance of C or S and the adversary but the
ﬂows are all oracle-generated, this event is denoted by AskH-Passive4;
– an instance of C and the adversary, where at least one ﬂow is not oracle-
generated, this event is denoted by AskH-withC4;
– an instance of S and the adversary, where at least one ﬂow is not Compute-
oracle-generated, this event is denoted by AskH-withS4;
Assume that there is a tuple (A∗,B∗,D = CDHg(A∗/upwd,B∗/vpwd)) such that
S
￿
￿
￿C
￿
￿
￿(gsi)i
￿
￿
￿A∗
￿
￿
￿B∗
￿
￿
￿K′
C
￿
￿
￿D
￿
￿
￿pwd
￿
￿
￿i or S
￿
￿
￿C
￿
￿
￿(gsi)i
￿
￿
￿A∗
￿
￿
￿B∗
￿
￿
￿K′
S
￿
￿
￿D
￿
￿
￿pwd
￿
￿
￿i
is in ΛH, for any password pwd of the adversary’s choice.If the corresponding transcript ((C,B∗),(S,A∗,(gsi)i)) comes from an exe-
cution between instances of C and S, it means that both A∗ and B∗ have been
simulated (and the adversary was only passive). In this case, we know the dis-
crete logarithms a∗ and b∗, and
CDHg(A∗/upwd,B∗/vpwd) =
ga
∗b
∗
  (va
∗
ub
∗
)pwd
CDHg(v,u)pwd2 .
Since pwd is non-zero in Zq, it can be inverted modulo q and then,
CDHg(X,Y ) =
￿
ga
∗b
∗
  va
∗ pwd   ub
∗ pwd
CDHg(A∗/upwd,B∗/vpwd)
￿1/pwd
2
.
Therefore Pr[AskH-Passive4] ≤ qh × Succ
cdh
g (T + 4τe).
If the corresponding transcript ((C,B∗),(S,A∗,(gsi)i)) comes from an execu-
tion between an instance of C and the adversary, where at least at one ﬂow is not
oracle-generated, it means that B∗ has been simulated and the other has been
generated by the adversary. We know that either the secret key-corrupt query
or the password corrupt query has not been asked (otherwise the simulation was
performed using H in game G3).
– Assume that the secret key-corrupt query has not been made before this
session, then xc and h are unknown to the adversary. Then it is quite hard
to compute hsi = (gsi)xC (no information at all): qh/q.
– If the secret key-corrupt query has been made, it implies that the password-
corrupt query has not been made. Due to the games which were canceled in
this game, there is at most one password pwd such that there exists an index
i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N, such that:
S
￿
￿
￿C
￿
￿
￿(g
si)i
￿
￿
￿A
∗
￿
￿
￿B
∗
￿
￿
￿KS
￿
￿
￿KS
￿
￿
￿pwd
￿
￿
￿i
is in ΛH. In other words, for every transcript, there is only one password
which can be tested by the adversary:
P
C D(qC).
If the corresponding transcript ((C,B∗),(S,A∗,(gsi)i)) comes from an execu-
tion between instances of S and the adversary, where at least at one ﬂow is not
Compute-oracle-generated, it means that (A∗,(gsi)i) has been simulated and B∗
has been generated by the adversary. Since the server accepted a non-Compute-
oracle-generated, it means that the biometric corrupt query has been made for
the corresponding client C. Thereafter, the same analysis, according to the secret
key-corrupt status and the password-corrupt status, as above can be done.
We can thus conclude with
Pr[AskH4] ≤
X
C
D(qC) +
qh
q
+ qh   Succ
cdh
g (T + 4τe).5 Discussion
5.1 Optimality and Tightness
The authentication probability upper bound presented in Theorem 1 has two
leading terms which are
qS
 
εfa +
￿ τ
τ−t
￿
2ℓ(τ−t) +
Nt   (2ℓ − 1)t
2ℓN(t − 1)!
!
and
X
C
D(qC).
If ℓ is large enough, then the last two terms in the parenthesis are negligible, that
is why we focus on the two terms which cannot be made negligible even with
larger parameters: qS   εfa and
P
C D(qC). We claim that our scheme is optimal
and the security result is tight: these two terms could not be avoided, with any
better protocol.
Let us consider the following adversary: A asks for both a password and a
secret key corrupt queries and then tries to authenticate using her own biometric.
Every time she tries to authenticate, her success probability is equal to the false
acceptance probability. Thus, her global success probability is approximately
equal to qS   εfa. This attack is generic, independent of any speciﬁc protocol,
and therefore this shows that the ﬁrst upper bound cannot be avoided by any
cryptographic means.
Secondly, let us consider the adversary which asks for all the secret key-
corrupt and (liveness assumption) biometric-corrupt queries, against all the
clients: the system is now protected by the passwords only. Thereafter, for each
client C, she makes qC impersonation attempts with the server, using the qC
most probable passwords. For every client C, the success probability is upper-
bounded by D(qC), therefore the global success probability is approximately
equal to
P
C D(qC) (it shows that the best attack consists in trying the most
probable passwords against as many clients as possible). Once again, the adver-
sary is generic and independent of any protocol. Therefore, this bound cannot
be avoided either.
The other terms being negligible, our global upper-bound against authenti-
cation is tight, and our protocol optimal. The same way, one can show optimality
and tightness for the semantic security.
5.2 Practical Parameters
Let us see what it gives with practical values. An iris scan is usually encoded
over N = 1024 bits and t = 300 is considered as a good threshold for the
Hamming distance between two measurements of the same biometrics. With
such parameters, the false acceptance rate is estimated to 2−14. For a similar
false rejection rate, we can assume τ = 400 as a reasonable threshold. In this
case, if ℓ ≥ 4 then
￿ τ
τ−t
￿
2ℓ(τ−t) +
Nt   (2ℓ − 1)t
2ℓN(t − 1)!
≤
￿400
100
￿
2400 +
23000
22896(299)!
≤
2321
2400 +
2104
22033 ≤ 2−78.Note that ℓ is the length of the authentication tags. The shorter they are, the
more eﬃcient the protocol is, from a communication point of view. Can we
reduce this value ℓ? Consider an adversary that has corrupted both the password
and the secret key. With very high probability (greater than εfa) the Hamming
distance between a measurement of the adversarybiometric and a client reference
biometric is approximately 512 and so there are 512 indices i such that αi = α′
i.
If ℓ = 1 there are approximately 512/2 other αi and α′
i which are equal, that is,
there are 768 indices i for which αi = α′
i and the adversary is able to impersonate
the client. Therefore, if ℓ = 1, with probability greater than the false acceptance
probability an adversary can authenticate.
This means that ℓ must be greater than 2, and the previous bound shows
that ℓ = 4 is a good choice. However if one wants to guarantee the correctness
of an honest execution (for all the indices i, αi = α′
i and βi = β′
i if and only if
the biometric bits are the same), then a good solution is to choose a greater ℓ.
If ℓ = 24, an honest execution succeeds with probability 2−14 ≈ εfa.
Another solution to guarantee the correctness of an honest session is to add
a distillation step [10] after the protocol. Distillation allows two entities, with
two secret keys with small Hamming distance, to agree on a common secret
key, at the price of revealing some of the bits of the original secret keys. With a
distillation step, one can choose ℓ = 4. Even if the resulting secret is shorter than
the original ones, this is not a problem in our case, since the original ones are
quite large. The distillation step also allows to prevent some denial-of-service
attacks where the adversary ﬂips some of the α′
i (this is possible only if the
liveness assumption is broken) or βi. If for this i, Ki = K′
i then with high
probability the two entities will generate two diﬀerent secret keys, whereas they
both accept (a few modiﬁcations might not ﬂip the decision), and then think that
they share the same secret key. With a classical key conﬁrmation, this attack
can be detected, and the aﬀected sessions identiﬁed. However the advantage of
the distillation is that it allows to correct the errors introduced by the adversary
or due to hazard, and then to avoid replaying the protocol once more.
5.3 Conclusion
In this paper, we deﬁned a quite strong security model, since it allows a lot
of information leakage for the adversary. It guarantees that the adversary has
to break all the protections to impersonate a client. Namely, as long as the
secret key is not recovered from the secure device, one can show that the success
probability of the adversary against our scheme is negligible. As the unclonable
device is probably the strongest and the most realistic protection, we can say
that our protocol is quite secure.
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